What is Intelligence?
Human intelligence (HUMINT) are gathered from a person in the location in question. Sources can include the following:
Geospatial intelligence (GEOINT) are gathered from satellite and aerial photography, or mapping/terrain data.
Open-source intelligence (OSINT) are gathered from open sources. OSINT can be further segmented by the source type: Internet/General, Scientific/Technical, and various HUMINT specialties, e.g. trade shows, association meetings, and interviews.
OSINT is defined in the United States of America by Public Law 109-163 as cited by both the U.S. Director of National Intelligence and the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD), as intelligence “produced from publicly available information that is collected, exploited, and disseminated in a timely manner to an appropriate audience for the purpose of addressing a specific intelligence requirement.” As defined by NATO, OSINT is intelligence “derived from publicly available information, as well as other unclassified information that has limited public distribution or access.”
According to political scientist Jeffrey T. Richelson, “open source acquisition involves procuring verbal, written, or electronically transmitted material that can be obtained legally. In addition to documents and videos available via the Internet or provided by a human source, others are obtained after U.S. or allied forces have taken control of a facility or site formerly operated by a foreign government or terrorist group.”
Former Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for Analysis Mark M. Lowenthal defines OSINT as “any and all information that can be derived from overt collection: all types of media, government reports and other documents, scientific research and reports, commercial vendors of information, the Internet, and so on. The main qualifiers to open-source information are that it does not require any type of clandestine collection techniques to obtain it and that it must be obtained through means that entirely meet the copyright and commercial requirements of the vendors where applicable.”
Signals intelligence (SIGINT) are gathered from interception of signals.
COMINT is a sub-category of signals intelligence that engages in dealing with messages or voice information derived from the interception of foreign communications. COMINT is commonly referred to as SIGINT, which can cause confusion when talking about the broader intelligence disciplines. The US Joint Chiefs of Staff defines it as “Technical information and intelligence derived from foreign communications by other than the intended recipients”.
COMINT, which is defined to be communications among people, will reveal some or all of the following:
– Who is transmitting?
– Where they are located, and, if the transmitter is moving, the report may give a plot of the signal against location?
– If known, the organizational function of the transmitter
– The time and duration of transmission, and the schedule if it is a periodic transmission
– The frequencies and other technical characteristics of their transmission
– If the transmission is encrypted or not, and if it can be decrypted. If it is possible to intercept either an originally transmitted cleartext or obtain it through cryptanalysis, the language of the communication and a translation (when needed).
– The addresses, if the signal is not a general broadcast and if addresses are retrievable from the message. These stations may also be COMINT (e.g., a confirmation of the message or a response message), ELINT (e.g., a navigation beacon being activated) or both. Rather than, or in addition to, an address or other identifier, there may be information on the location and signal characteristics of the responder.
Voice interception
A basic COMINT technique is to listen for voice communications, usually over radio but possibly “leaking” from telephones or from wiretaps. If the voice communications are encrypted, traffic analysis may still give information.
In the Second World War, for security the United States used Native American volunteer communicators known as code talkers, who used languages such as Navajo, Comanche and Choctaw, which would be understood by few people, even in the U.S. Even within these uncommon languages, the code talkers used specialized codes, so a “butterfly” might be a specific Japanese aircraft. British forces made limited use of Welsh speakers for the same reason.
While modern electronic encryption does away with the need for armies to use obscure languages, it is likely that some groups might use rare dialects that few outside their ethnic group would understand.
Text interception
Morse code interception was once very important, but Morse code telegraphy is now obsolete in the western world, although possibly used by special operations forces. Such forces, however, now have portable cryptographic equipment.
Specialists scan radio frequencies for character sequences (e.g., electronic mail) and fax.
Signaling channel interception
A given digital communications link can carry thousands or millions of voice communications, especially in developed countries. Without addressing the legality of such actions, the problem of identifying which channel contains which conversation becomes much simpler when the first thing intercepted is the signaling channel that carries information to set up telephone calls. In civilian and many military use, this channel will carry messages in Signaling System 7 protocols.
Retrospective analysis of telephone calls can be made from Call detail record (CDR) used for billing the calls.
Monitoring friendly communications
More a part of communications security than true intelligence collection, SIGINT units still may have the responsibility of monitoring one’s own communications or other electronic emissions, to avoid providing intelligence to the enemy. For example, a security monitor may hear an individual transmitting inappropriate information over an unencrypted radio network, or simply one that is not authorized for the type of information being given. If immediately calling attention to the violation would not create an even greater security risk, the monitor will call out one of the BEADWINDOW codes used by Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, the United States, and other nations working under their procedures. Standard BEADWINDOW codes (e.g., “BEADWINDOW 2”) include:
– Position: (e.g., disclosing, in an insecure or inappropriate way), “Friendly or enemy position, movement or intended movement, position, course, speed, altitude or destination or any air, sea or ground element, unit or force.”
– Capabilities: “Friendly or enemy capabilities or limitations. Force compositions or significant casualties to special equipment, weapons systems, sensors, units or personnel. Percentages of fuel or ammunition remaining.”
– Operations: “Friendly or enemy operation – intentions progress, or results. Operational or logistic intentions; mission participants flying programmes; mission situation reports; results of friendly or enemy operations; assault objectives.”
– Electronic warfare (EW): “Friendly or enemy electronic warfare (EW) or emanations control (EMCON) intentions, progress, or results. Intention to employ electronic countermeasures (ECM); results of friendly or enemy ECM; ECM objectives; results of friendly or enemy electronic counter-countermeasures (ECCM); results of electronic support measures/tactical SIGINT (ESM); present or intended EMCON policy; equipment affected by EMCON policy.”
– Friendly or enemy key personnel: “Movement or identity of friendly or enemy officers, visitors, commanders; movement of key maintenance personnel indicating equipment limitations.”
– Communications security (COMSEC): “Friendly or enemy COMSEC breaches. Linkage of codes or codewords with plain language; compromise of changing frequencies or linkage with line number/circuit designators; linkage of changing call signs with previous call signs or units; compromise of encrypted/classified call signs; incorrect authentication procedure.”
– Wrong circuit: “Inappropriate transmission. Information requested, transmitted or about to be transmitted which should not be passed on the subject circuit because it either requires greater security protection or it is not appropriate to the purpose for which the circuit is provided.”
– Other codes as appropriate for the situation may be defined by the commander.
In WWII, for example, the Japanese Navy, by poor practice, identified a key person’s movement over a low-security cryptosystem. This made possible Operation Vengeance, the interception and death of the Combined Fleet commander, Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto.
Signals intelligence (SIGINT) is intelligence-gathering by interception of signals, whether communications between people (communications intelligence—abbreviated to COMINT) or from electronic signals not directly used in communication (electronic intelligence—abbreviated to ELINT). Signals intelligence is a subset of intelligence collection management. As classified and sensitive information is usually encrypted, signals intelligence in turn involves the use of cryptanalysis to decipher the messages. Traffic analysis—the study of who is signaling whom and in what quantity—is also used to integrate information again
Technical intelligence (TECHINT) are gathered from analysis of weapons and equipment used by the armed forces of foreign nations, or environmental conditions.
Financial intelligence (FININT) are gathered from analysis of monetary transactions
General Information
Most of the data is based on OSM (Open Street Map) or third-party WMS services. Other data is based on OSINT (Open Source Intelligence) data collection and manual mapping by guerillamap.
Currently, we have two collaborations with global intelligence firms, sharing their data with us:
The main map “Guerillamap” focuses on the conflicts worldwide. It shows geopolitical, military and infrastructural data. The data is divided into different categories: Conflicts, Military, Infrastructure, Environment and some Auxiliary data.
“Conflicts” shows the recent military, political and socioeconomical conflicts worldwide Each of these conflicts has the potential for a further escalation and possibly have global consequences. Some of these conflicts may seem far in the past, but they are still relevant up to this date and can rekindle anytime.
Layers:
Large migration can lead to conflicts, but they are also an indicator in which nation the people tendentially want to live – and where not! So migration is caused by conflict and can again lead to more conflict.
“Military” shows Global military installations, such as Airports, bases or nuclear missile sites. Most of the data derived from Open Streep Map, but quite a lot was mapped manually – either by us or by IOSI (iosi.global).
Some of the most important military – and some non-military – alliances worldwide. Source: Wikipedia.org
The Military Comparison map shows the firepower of the 45 strongest nations. All data derived from: globalfirepower.com. The firepower index not only compares military units, but also the county’s geography, financial situation etc.
Layers:
The most devastating natural disasters of the current year. Click the icons to receive more information and a link to news sites describing the disaster. There are additional layers linked to natural disasters, such as recent weather data.
“Weather”:
“Disasters”:
“Hazard”:
Use OSINT by yourself and map whatever you feel is related to military, conflict or geopolitics.
There are plots of several nations for when and where specific IMINT (Imagery Intelligence) satellites are passing. Note that the time is always in UTC (universal time). The passings are modelled using the TLE (telemetry data) for these satellites. The TLE data is used from N2YO.com and Celestrack.org. A passing is defined by a minimum of 45° elevation above horizon from the target location to the satellite – this is usually the maximum pointing capability of such satellites. Note that the modelled target location is always at 1 m a.m.s.l – so no terrain data is used in modelling the passes.
Use this STANAG table to get an idea, what GSD is needed to detect your targets:
So for example: A Vehicle can be detected with a GSD of 1.5 m – but at this GSD, we have no idea what kind of vehicle it is. With a GSD of 0.5 m we can probably say if it is a tank, a pickup truck or a civil car. If we want to know if it is a Tesla or a Toyota, we would need a GSD of 0.15 m – for tanks probably a GSD of 0.3 m would be enough. Please read more in IMINT and image analysis in our introduction article here: https://guerillamap.com/imint-a-very-basic-introduction/
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