Russia has a total of 249 satellites (as of March year 2024).

Only 8% of all Russian satellites have an IMINT mission. We can see a summary here (as of March 2024):

The total number of satellites dropped significantly in the 90’s, because of two reasons: the fall of the UDSSR and the digitization of IMINT satellites, so satellites could be operational in orbits for a much longer time. This digitization process was achieved by the US already in the 70s. Russia continued to operate legacy instruments with analogue film until 2015 (Kobalt-M). Nowadays, especially China is increasing its satellite number.

Russia has one major advantage: the enormous size of the country leads to very distributed ground control stations. With many distributed ground stations, Russia is able to downlink the image data very fast and probably at every orbit of its IMINT satellites. The ground stations are located here:

Resurs-PM 1.5m mirror:

Resurs-PM scheme:

2. Persona/ Kvarts, Kosmos-2486/ 2506

Persona is based on the Resurs-P satellite, but has a bigger, 1.5m aperture.

Starts: 2013 & 2015

Orbit: 714 × 732 km, inclination: 98.3°, period: 93.48 min

Sensor: 1.5 m mirror, panchromatic GSD: 0.33 m, multispectral GSD: probably around 1 – 1.5 m, infrared GSD: ??? m, probably around 4 to 5 m if it has IR at all.

Example image (probably)

3. Bars-M

The purpose of Bars-M is the military cartography, the creation of maps for targeting of ICBMs.

Bars-M delivers high-resolution stereo images.

Size of 4.0 x 2.3 x 2.3 m

Mass of around 4’000 kg

Planned lifetime of ≥ 5 years

Starts: 2015 & 2016

Sensor

Optical camera system OEK Karat (ОЭК Карат)

CCD sensor with 512 x 512 pixels and 16 µm pixel pitch

Dual telescope (stereo) with an aperture of 390 mm

Triple-lens system built by LOMO (Leningrad Optical Mechanical Association)

GSD of 1.1 to 1.35 m

7 spectral bands

60 km swath width

Dual laser altimeter instrument

1300 km swath width

4. EO-MKA (Cosmos 2568 and maybe 2574 & 2575)

EO-MKA is a 150 kg satellite inspired by SkySat and it is pretty sure, that Cosmos 2568 is such an EO-MKA. The GSD is reported to be 0.9 m for their 310 to 360 km orbits. The successor to EO-MKA will be Razbeg or EO-MKA-V, a little bit heavier satellite (~250 kg), but probably none has been launched yet. These satellites are supposed to fill the gap between the aging and close to the end of lifetime Persona satellites and the new Razdan satellites, which are not quite ready yet as it seems. Cosmos 2574 and 2575 are also thought to be EO-MKAs, however, they could also be inspector satellites of the Nivelir – Burevestnik type.

5. Kanopus-V

Kanopus-V is a civilian/military joint system for cartography purposes,Eenvironmental monitoring, mineral mapping, etc.

Mass of around 400 kg

Planned lifetime of ≥ 5 years

Kanopus-V 1, launched on 22 July 2012 at 10:41 Moscow time from Baikonur 31/6 with a Soyuz-FG-Fregat.

Kanopus-V-IK, launched on 14 July 2017 at 10:37 Moscow time from Baikonur 31/6 with a Soyuz-2-1a.

Kanopus-V-3, launched on 01 February 2018 at 05:07 Moscow time from Vostochny 1-S with a Soyuz-2-1a.

Kanopus-V-4, launched on 01 February 2018 at 05:07 Moscow time from Vostochny 1-S with a Soyuz-2-1a.

Kanopus-V-5, launched on 27 December 2018 at 05:07 Moscow time from Vostochny 1-S with a Soyuz-2-1a.

Kanopus-V-6, launched on 27 December 2018 at 05:07 Moscow time from Vostochny 1-S with a Soyuz-2-1a.

Panchromatic camera (ПСС, PSS)

• Pushbroomsensor
• 1 – 2.5 m GSD, using 0.5 – 0.8 µm range
• 20 – 23 km swathwidth

Multispectralcamera (МСС, MSS)

• Pushbroomsensor
• 4 bands (0.55 µm, 0.65 µm, 0.75 µm, 0.85 µm) or 0.46 – 0.84 µm (?)
• 12 m GSD
• 20 km swathwidth

Multi-channel mid and far IR radiometer (МСУ-ИК-СР, MSU-IK-SR)

• Cross-track scanner
• 2 channels: MWIR (3.5 – 4.1 µm) and TIR (8.1 – 9.1 µm)
• 200 m GSD
• 2’000 km swath width

6. Pion-NKS & Kondor SAR

Pion-NKS is a Kondor type radar observation satellite and is currently Russia’s best SAR IMINT system. The radar consists of two antennas mounted on either side of the satellite.

Each of the antennas has a diameter of 12.1 meters and a focal distance of 5 meters.

The radar system assists the passive ELINT systems in determining the location and type of sea-going vessels. The images it takes may not be detailed enough to readily identify the observed vessels. A patent co-authored by two of the radar’s chief designers describes a complex method to identify ships by comparing satellite radar images with three-dimensional computer models of known types of ships compiled on the basis of other radar imagery, photographs and drawings. The sensor is probably not capable to detect smaller land-based targets, such as tanks.

Image from Kondor, which is thought to be very similar:

Russian spaceborne IMINT analysis:

Despite a nominal revival of the Russian orbital remote-sensing assets during the 2010s, their actual usefulness for federal civilian and military agencies is difficult to assess. In fact, there are clear signs that the new-generation remote-sensing systems deployed by Russia are afflicted by the same problems that had been known since the Soviet period. In addition to the high failure rate of the satellites, the products and services they do provide often fail to meet the requirements of end users and are not competitive with equivalent foreign capabilities.

Analysis during Ukraine war:

A critical weakness of the Russian strike campaign was battle damage assessment. First, the Russian military appears to have presumed that if an action had been ordered and carried out then it had succeeded, unless there was direct evidence to the contrary. Evidence of success appears to have disproportionately relied on three data points:

confirmation from pilots that they hit their target; confirmation from Russian satellites that a site showed damage; and confirmation from signals intelligence (SIGINT) that Ukrainians reported a strike and damage to their equipment.

Russian satellite reconnaissance proved very limited, even though Russian survey space reconnaissance of Ukraine has been conducted since at least 2012, and detailed reconnaissance, in the interests of invasion planning, since mid-2021. A probable reason for this may be the insufficient number of satellites in the orbital grouping of the VKS and the overestimation of their technical capabilities. Indirect confirmation of this explanation is provided by the fact that the AFRF began buying additional satellite images of the territory of Ukraine and individual military facilities on the world market in April 2022.

One of the visible failures of satellite intelligence is the inability to detect on time a significant volume of strategic railway movements by the UAF, which, in March 2022 amounted to three–four echelons per day.

After 2022 Russia drastically improved its space assets, it brought almost 100 new satellites of all purposes into orbits. Also, its IMINT capabilities improved by at least 6 new satellites. However, compared to China or the US, Russia is still way behind in both, quality and quantity.