It’s not about winning a war, it’s preventing it through deterrence

Simon Hagmayer, 21.01.2026

A weak state (esp. if it has natural resources, or is located in a strategical location) will be invaded sooner or later, that’s fact, it always was like that, it will always be like that.

People dreaming of a world without armed conflict are delusional, the solely fact that resources are not endless will always put people in a state of competition and geography ensures that resources can never be distributed equally. Even in small social systems, such as a classroom of 20 people you always have at least one bully not playing by the rules, how can we think of a whole planet with 8 billion people playing by the rules, or head of states, economic leaders, etc..

The only way to live in peace is through strength, si vis pacem para bellum. We saw it during the Pax Romana and more recently during Pax Americana. One nation, so strong no one near it’s radius of influence dares to not obey the rules. These times are now over, definitely, and we are heading into another transition era, one that may eventually give rise to a new, more stable equilibrium.

But here comes the clue, not all hope is lost, even during such contested times. Even then, there can be quite stable peace zones established, however locally. The rules are the same, they can only be achieved through strength, through deterrence. The important note here is that deterrence does not require the ability to defeat a superior adversary outright. It requires the capacity to raise the expected costs of aggression to an unacceptable level. I’ve been asked so many times for what reason Switzerland even has an army, it cannot defeat a country like Germany, for example, right? That may be true, but it is beside the point. Switzerland possesses few exploitable natural resources beyond water, and while its central location in Europe is strategically relevant, the costs of invasion—particularly given defensive fortifications in the Alps—would far outweigh any potential gains. Strategic decision-making, at its core, resembles economic calculation: potential benefits are weighed against anticipated losses. When the latter dominate, deterrence succeeds. And that is also the key point I want to give to the people in Europe shouting “warmongers” and “we are against arming, wo do not want to go to war” – yes and that is exactly why we have to arm, we are arming to not have to go to war, to prevent it.

There are 3 deterrence options:

Nuclear deterrence.
Definitely the most effective one and after Trump II renewed debates about nuclear weapons programs are likely. Sweden, Finland and Norway already showed interest in a joint program. Japan and South Korea are likely future candidates too and if I were to make a consulting, I would encourage everyone to do so.
Conventional military strength.
Conventional forces remain the most visible and widely used means of deterrence. Military alliances can significantly enhance deterrence, but they are inherently less reliable than possessing autonomous defensive capabilities, as alliance commitments are ultimately political decisions.
Economic dependency and ties
This was one of the most prominent argument of delusional people not believing the civilized world will ever fight wars again after the end of the cold war. They thought that deep economic integration would make war prohibitively costly and therefore obsolete. Recent history has shown this assumption to be overly optimistic. While economic ties can contribute to deterrence, they are less effective in a multipolar system where alternative trade partners and supply chains exist.

Immediate surrender to an adversary is another option, hoping for no losses. That was the option that many cynical people, also here in the west, proposed to Ukraine after the full scale invasion- just give up, it’s not worth fighting. However, historical experience suggests that societies which abandon resistance often endure the most severe consequences. The Baltic states under Soviet rule, for example, experienced imposed governments, mass deportations, forced collectivization, and systematic suppression of language, culture, and religion. Tibet represents another case where capitulation did not spare the population from long-term repression.

In sum, peace has rarely been the product of goodwill alone. It has more often been secured by credible deterrence, grounded in the realistic assessment of power, costs, and consequences.