Russian, Chinese and Myanmar’s Junta war-related electromagnetic emissions observed from space

Russian, Chinese and Myanmar’s Junta, war-related electromagnetic emissions observed from space

Simon Hagmayer, 04.01.2026

In Summary

What we observe

Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, electromagnetic warfare has intensified dramatically, reaching unprecedented levels. Extensive GPS jamming and spoofing, radar interference, counter-drone electronic warfare, and large-scale air-target radar activity now emit signals so powerful they can be detected by space-based sensors not designed for this purpose. While first observed in the Russo-Ukrainian war, similar phenomena are now occurring in regions such as Myanmar, near Taiwan and Lebanon.

These activities cause widespread navigation disruptions, including incorrect ship positions transmitted via AIS and faulty GPS data received by aircraft. Satellite observations across multiple frequency bands (P, L, C, X, and Ku) from instruments such as Sentinel-1, TerraSAR-X, AMSR, ALOS PALSAR, and ESA’s Biomass P-SAR reveal strong interference signals linked to electronic warfare.

Overall, the study demonstrates that modern electronic warfare now operates at a scale and intensity detectable globally from space, marking a significant escalation in electromagnetic conflict.

What we conclude

Now, after we have seen these signals there are three main questions:

We see the strongest emissions along the Russo-Ukrainian border, Kaliningrad, St. Petersburg and Murmansk, all near high value targets, like air bases. Some quite similar signals (both, L- and C-band) were present in China near Taiwan, in the sea around Taiwan and in the Junta controlled areas in Myanmar.

Sentinel-1 derived locations of transmitters:

What is the purpose of this electromagnetic emission?
Most likely a combination of different purposes: Detection, Jamming/Spoofing, Communication. In general: Protecting high value targets, this is given due to the geographical locations the signals occur.

Jamming and spoofing can be subdivided further into different categories:

Blind Ukrainian effectors (missiles, drones, …) : Jam their GPS, blind missile radar heads to prevent target finding
Blind ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance) : Blind radar satellite and aerial reconnaissance
Disrupt communication: Jam satellite or drone data links, ground based communication, etc.

What systems/emitters could be responsible?
A whole bunch of different systems probably, some are specific EW systems for GPS jamming and spoofing, like Tobol, or, Pole-21, some for radar jamming, like Repellent-1 or Tirada-2. Others are probably air defense radars sending at maximum power, like associated radars of Pantsir or S-400 SAM systems.

When we talk about the strong C-band signals in the Sentinel-1 images, then Repellent-1 (anti-UAV) or Tirada-2 (anti Satcom, like Starlink) systems are highly likely, in combination with maybe S-400 radar systems.

Of course in the Chinese/ Myanmar case there will be similar systems.

Notably the Russians have a huge arsenal of different, domestically produced EW systems. Russia
is using everything it has in respect to EW in this conflict. We also have to consider
radar detection and communication systems and not just EW. So when we think of the
full scale war we have to imagine all these systems being in service in an
integrated electromagnetic defense web, each with their respective advantages
and functions.

In Detail

1. What we observe

Since Russia’s full scale invasion of Ukraine, the electromagnetic warfare was pushed to a whole new level. GPS jamming and spoofing, radar jamming, counter drone EW (Electronic Warfare) or the scale and amplitude of radar air target identification reached levels never seen before. The signals emitted in this war are sometimes strong enough to be seen from space sensors that were never intended to monitor such signals and could not be seen before, or at least not at such a scale. The emitted power is probably strong enough to grill a chicken in front of theses radar dishes. The phenomenon is now no longer limited to the Russo-Ukraine war, but we now see it in Myanmar, Lebanon and near Taiwan too.

We see wrong positions of ships sent via their AIS. We see bad GPS positions picked up by airplanes near and in Russia. We see massive L, C and X-band signals on different imaging satellites, such as Sentinel-1, AMSR, TerraSAR-X, or Biomass P-SAR.

Here is an example of the detected GPS-jamming. Airplanes can transmit a so-called ADS-B signal, sending information like position, altitude, speed, aircraft identification and so on. One of the parameters transmitted is a GPS quality indicator and we can map this information, where every red dot shows that a military aircraft transmitted a bad GPS quality at that time:

We can clearly identify areas with bad GPS, mostly in Russia and on this specific day also in the Aegean Sea, or Malaysia. Gpsjam.org takes it one step further and also includes civil aircraft; this gives us a more complete picture:

In the radar domain, there are 4 different satellite instruments we used in this study. For P-band we used a new instrument called P-SAR onboard the Biomass satellite from ESA with a center frequency of 435 MHz. In L-Band we used the Japanese (JAXA) ALOS PALSAR satellite with a 1257.5 MHz center frequency. In C-band ESA’s Sentinel-1 with 5.4 GHz and in X-band the German TerraSAR-X with roughly 9.6 GHz and AMSR, a Japanese passive radar with a 10 GHz band and we used the same sensor also for Ku-band, where it can observe 18 GHz signals.

Some impressions from the different radar bands and interferences observed:

Now, after we have seen these signals there are three main questions:

What frequencies are affected?
What is the purpose of this electromagnetic emission?
What systems/emitters could be responsible?

1.1. Literature

A quick search for the occurrence of these signals did not bring up much. Most articles are focused on GPS jamming, especially for some special single cases with prominent figures on a plane (von der Leyen) or air traffic navigation difficulties in countries bordering Russia. However, much less information can be gathered on higher frequencies, like C or X-band.

An article in navalnews started when the first signals were visible on Sentinel-1 satellites in Sevastopol in 2023: https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2023/11/russias-powerful-invisible-defenses-around-sevastopol-rendered-visible/. The article suggested the interference is an EW protection for countering UAV’s by satellite navigation spoofing, therefore GPS/GNSS spoofing. The spoofing could be seen on ship AIS signals, where several ships near Crimea reported an obvious wrong position. It is interesting that the vessels’ false positions were clustered around the international airport. This may indicate that the source of the jamming is there. The article concluded that the C-band signals visible in the Sentinel-1 images were specifically emitted to blind these satellite images and that it just appeared on C-band. Recent images from TerraSAR-X however also confirm such signals in X-band and we do not think that the emissions are specifically sent to blind satellite imagery, at least not as their primary goal, but more on that later.

Another article from bulgarianmilitary discussed possible emitters after the occurrence in Sevastopol in 2023: https://bulgarianmilitary.com/2023/11/27/unknown-russian-complex-near-sevastopol-creates-strong-interference/. Their theory was that it was either Voronezh early warning systems or Nebo-M. I think the Voronezh theory can be rejected quite easily given the fact that these systems are stationary and not necessarily near the emitter positions we can observe, at least not at all sites. So maybe they are part of the game, but definitely not entirely:

Mapped locations of Voronezh early warning sensors

An article by Wes O’Donnell (https://wesodonnell.medium.com/a-peek-inside-russias-gps-jamming-playbook-7c02da481009) shows Russia’s different EW systems specialized in GPS jamming and spoofing:

Pole-21

Rather than relying on a single massive transmitter, Pole-21 disperses dozens of small jamming nodes across civilian cell towers or utility masts.
Each node emits noise centered on GPS and other GNSS frequencies. By linking them together, Russia creates an RF “sprinkler system” that covers entire regions. Kaliningrad bristles with these nodes, and Crimea has hosted clusters as well. A Pole-21 cluster, with dozens of nodes high on towers, can black out areas tens of km wide.

R-330Zh “Zhitel”

For tactical bubbles. This truck-mounted jammer can detect and jam a wide swath of spectrum, from satellite phones to GSM to GPS. Its purpose is to create localized denial zones for advancing units or to protect command posts from drone swarms.
With a range of tens of kilometers, it’s mobile enough to “jam and scoot,” complicating counter-battery or airstrike attempts.

Krasukha-4

The big iron of Russia’s EW forces. Mounted on an 8×8 chassis, it’s designed to blind airborne radars like NATO AWACS or US JSTARS. Its primary targets are surveillance aircraft, but the sheer amount of RF power it pours into the ether creates collateral GPS disruption in nearby bands. If you’re flying near a Krasukha emission lobe, your satellite navigation is going to have a bad day. A Krasukha with high-gain panels can project disruption hundreds of kilometers in the right geometry. The former version Krasukha-2 was also widely used to jam radar signals in S band (2.3 GHz–3.7 GHz), the version 4 on the other hand can jam X-band radar.

Tobol (14Ts227)

Strategic level. This isn’t a truck at all but a network of fixed satellite monitoring and interference sites across Russia.

Analysts believe at least one Tobol node operates out of Kaliningrad. Unlike Pole-21’s brute force or Zhitel’s mobility, Tobol provides selective, time-bound interference aimed at adversary satellite links.

In practice, that means Russia can create carefully shaped GPS denial zones without spraying the entire spectrum.

1.2. Frequencies

We can definitely see strong signals in the 3 highlighted bands, and since S-band is right in between it is highly likely that it is affected as well:

The P-band also shows some artifacts and noise, but it cannot be stated for sure that massive emissions are present like in the other bands. Higher frequencies than X-band do not show any disturbances, at least not at an 18 GHz observation.

What purpose do these frequencies usually have?

L-band

ADS-B
At around 1.2 GHz sits the GPS frequency, with other providers like the European Galileo in similar frequencies.
Mobile service and telecommunication

S-band

Wi-Fi & Bluetooth(2.3 GHz to 2.6 GHz)
Satellite communications
Radar Systems
· Satellite imagery, e.g. ALOS PALSAR

C-band

While C-band is used for radar imaging, like the Sentinel-1 satellite, there are other applications working in the same frequencies:

Radar Systems, e.g. air traffic control radar
Fixed Wireless Broadband
Microwave Links
Wi-Fi or 5G signals, can work in this frequency band
Satellite communication often works in part of the broader C-band (4.0–8.0 GHz), which is particularly suitable for long-distance communication because it can penetrate the atmosphere and is less affected by weather conditions like rain.

X-band

Radar Systems, e.g. air traffic control radar or maritime vessel traffic control
Terrestrial communications and networking
Space communications, like data downloads and uplinks

L-band and GNSS

We can observe massive interference in the L-band using the ALOS sensor. Massive, not just in signal strength, but also in area coverage. Basically, the whole Russo-Ukrainian border and Russo-NATO border is covered in L-band interferences. Furthermore, as stated earlier, we can back that claim by GPS interferences measured in these areas, because GPS works in L-band too.

C-band

Sentinel-1 beautifully shows the massive signal interference, e.g. on Crimea. This amplitude is something completely new, there were some analyses earlier, pre Ukraine war, but much weaker. For example a Patriot air defense system could be detected in Israel using Sentinel-1 images, but the signals detected there were much weaker:

The signals on Crimea are magnitudes stronger:

X-band

TerraSAR-X imagery shows more or less the same interferences we see in C-band, here an example from the Kerch Strait.

The Japanese AMSR is passive radar satellite with a very coarse spatial resolution, nevertheless, the disturbances are so strong, they are visible even then, here in 10GHz in the Tula region, south of Moscow:

Higher than 10 GHz?

The same sensor (AMSR) also has bands with higher frequencies, here an example with 18 GHz:

Nothing is visible on the AMSR images over 10GHz, giving us an upper boundary for EW activity in X-band. However it is hard to say with such a coarse resolution, pretty sure there is some interference, maybe just some very local ones, in higher frequencies too.

Lower than L-band?

There is a new ESA P-band sensor onboard the “Biomass” satellite since 2025, and there are some images near the typical jamming areas in Russia. These P-band images show some noise, but we are not sure if it’s really EW related. At least some reference images over South America did not show such artifacts and therefore it might really be related to EW, but we can also say IF there is some jamming/ spoofing in P-band, then it must be much weaker than in C or L band and is then probably related to drone control and data transmission jamming, since that typically happens in the 433 MHz, 915 MHz or bluetooth/ wifi range.

Here some examples from the P-SAR sensor in Russia near the Ukrainian border:

We also started to listen to several SDR (Software Defined Radio) stations inside these jamming areas and it did not show much interference in the P-band either. If at all, we can maybe see some noise in the GPS L5 area near St. Petersburg (but that is again L-band) and maybe, just maybe, in the 433 MHz area in Korenovsk:

SDR stations investigated:

Korenovsk, 433MHz, looks indeed like a jamming signal, but the amplitude is low (-46 dB):

No jamming in Saratov, low frequency, even below P-band:

Noisier GPS (L-band) in St. Petersburg compared to Switzerland. Note that in Switzerland we
see a clear signal (brighter line) for the GPS frequency, whereas in St. Petersburg
this signals disappear inside these signal blocks with a wider bandwidth:

1.3. Spatial distribution

L-band disruptions were visible in Russia, China (specifically surrounding Taiwan) and Myanmar:

Around Taiwan the signals were mostly, or maybe exclusively sea-based, with some jamming possibly coming from Taiwan itself and not just PLA-sourced (PLA = People’s Liberation Army, the Chinese military). The largest and most intense signal block is further south, northwest from the Philippine city Laoag in the contested South China Sea.

In Myanmar the strongest signals are at the city of Naypyitaw, one of the Junta’s strongholds. In fact, all the emissions are coming from Junta controlled territory. There are for example some weaker signals observable over the capital of Mandalay.

The C-band, Sentinel-1 analysis shows more or less the same areas, but given the better spatial resolution and higher frequency, we can estimate the approximate emitter location much better.

Here an overview of the 2025 emissions:

We can conclude that these C-band EW, or radar systems must be at the following locations (where the signals intersect). > Link < to the map, blue markers are high emission areas and high-resolution-satellite-imagery confirmed locations of Pantsir air defense systems (we will talk about that later), red ones are emitter approximations according to the measured radar signals.

Crimea Saky airbase, Sevastopol (likely 2 systems), the 15th coastal artillery near Cape Fiolent and one near the Kerch Bridge.

We can also find these signals along other war-important parts of Russia, namely near St. Petersburg, Smolensk, Kursk and east from the sea of Azov and more precise Levashovo airbase and St. Petersburg international airport,

Smolensk north airport, somewhere in the open west of Kursk city,

the separate Electronic Warfare Center No.1270 Rostov, Primorsko airbase and Krymsk airbase

Moscow near Chkalovsky military airbase,

and somewhere near Ulyanovsk, probably at the nearby airbase.

One relatively new occurrence of such signals can be found at the Olenya airbase in the Murmansk Oblast, near the Finnish border. The Olenya air base was one of the 5 air bases, that got struck by Ukrainian FPV drones on the 1^st of June 2025. Several strategic bombers were destroyed during the strike.

Taiwan

Not just L-band interferences, but also C-band signals can be found in the sea around Taiwan as we did see in Russia. The signal in the following case must have been emitted from a ship given the location. Most probably, it is a Chinese military ship and part of a blockade exercise around Taiwan.

Two other Chinese C-band signals can be detected, one near the Zhanjiang naval base and Suixi airbase, the other near Xunwu.

In Myanmar we have a similar picture as for the L-band with a maximum in Naypyitaw and some in Maktila and Hinthada, also here exclusively in Junta controlled areas (shown on the right).

There is one signal burst visible in Lebanon, right between Tyros and Sidon, but that was the only such occurrence.

1.4. Temporal changes

It all started with a single location in Sevastopol in February 2023:

Then these signals in C-band along with more frequent GPS-jamming became more and more frequent and spatially abundant. First, especially the occupied Crimea was affected, then more and more adjacent regions to Ukraine, like Kursk, Belgorod, Voronezh and Rostov too. In the end, there were also signals further away from Ukraine, namely St. Petersburg, Murmansk, or Astrakhan.

Especially throughout the first half of 2025 we saw a massive increase in such strong signals. But then in the second half of 2025 there were also some significant reductions observable, namely on Crimea, where Ukrainian strikes likely destroyed many radar and EW systems. By now, an overall reduction can be seen, where the peak in emissions was maybe around April 2025.

China – Taiwan

The emissions around Taiwan can be directly linked to PLA exercises in the area, for example here on the 30^th of November, during a quite spontaneous PLA exercise when Taiwan’s president had a stopover in Hawaii:

Or here, ahead of the latest “Joint-Sword-2025” exercise from the 26^th December 2025:

2. What we hypothesize

2.1. Possible emitters

There is an amazing report from “3Gimbals” listing Russian EW systems from 2023:

Notably the Russians have a huge arsenal of different, domestically produced EW systems.

If we think of a single transmitter being responsible for all these emissions (which we don’t), then there are just a few systems capable of emitting in such a large frequency range. We have marked the systems in red in the graphic above. So theoretically it would be somewhat possible, systems like the Rb-636 or the Tirada-2 have a huge frequency range, but it is much more likely that there are several systems responsible for all the emissions we see. Furthermore, systems like the Avtobaza-M can detect signals in a huge range, but cannot transmit or jam in the same wide spectrum. And of course, Russia is using everything it has in respect to EW in this conflict, and that also includes radar detection and communication systems and not just EW. So when it comes to a full scale war we have to imagine all these systems being in service in an integrated electromagnetic defense web, each with their respective advantages and functions.

As stated before, some analysts focused on the following systems:

C-band : Voronezh, Nebo-M (actually uses VHF, UHF, L and X band, but is maybe part of the game)

GPS: Pole-21, R-330Zh “Zhitel”, Krasukha-4, Tobol (14Ts227)

These systems are definitely to consider, yes, but there are some more candidates.

The 96L6 radar, which is usually part of the S-400 air defense systems is a likely candidate too, as it reportedly works in C-band.

Pantsir air defense

The Pantsir system uses different frequencies: K-band, X-band, Ku-band, L-band, and S-band for different purposes, but officially no C-band. C-band is right in between the S and X-bands and is also used in other air defense systems, such as in the US-made Patriot system. So we can explain some interferences in the X-band we have seen before with Pantsir systems maybe and maybe even some interferences in C-band. The thing why I am so obsessed with these Pantsir systems is that they can be found on high resolution images on the right time and at most of the sites where we have seen the C-band emissions:

And they are definitely Pantsir-type systems, as this image from Kursk/ Khalino Air Base confirms:

Here the other candidates from the 3Gimbals analysis:

Whole spectrum, from L- to X-band:

P- to S-band

S-band:

P- to C-band:

S- to X-band

X-band:

So when we talk about the strong C-band signals in the Sentinel-1 images, then Repellent-1 (anti-UAV) or Tirada-2 (anti Satcom, like Starlink) systems are highly likely, in combination with maybe S-400 radar systems.

Of course in the Chinese case there will be similar systems, maybe even the same Russian-made ones and the Myanmar Junta will use the same Chinese or Russian systems as well. What we see right now is that the signals in China and Myanmar are weaker than the ones in Russia, so probably the Chinese are running their own equipment, or they just did not send in full power yet.

2.2. Possible purposes

We conclude that these signals are used to protect important areas, such as airfields, because we can measure where the emitter must be approximately and they are always somewhere near a valuable target. The question is just how exactly they are used for protection. We can think of these scenarios:

Detection
The radar is used for detection, e.g. drone or missile detection. This seems not very likely, since we cannot observe such strong signals anywhere else in the world and radar detection of aircrafts is definitely done everywhere. However, due to the scale of the war, the Russians might have stepped up the power bursts of their radar systems.
Jamming
More likely, due to the very powerful signal, it is used for jamming. Some missiles use radar to find their target, this can be prevented by saturating the signal, making the missile go “blind”. And of course you can jam reconnaissance platforms, like satellites or drones. Jamming also happens in GPS and probably also in data links and communication.
Communication
(Fixed wireless broadband, microwave links or wifi) Fixed wireless broadband systems, such as point-to-point communication links, often operate in the 5.4 GHz range. These systems are used to provide high-speed internet connections, especially in rural or underserved areas. In microwave communication, the 5.4 GHz band can be used for both terrestrial microwave links and backhaul communication, where high-bandwidth, point-to-point connections are required. Communication also seems less likely, because what we see here is massively more powerful in terms of amplitude than what such antennas (like 5G) typically have. I once had a discussion with someone stating what we see in the Sentinel-1 images are wifi signals, but Wi-Fi power at satellite altitude is negligible and these signals are incoherent and mostly filtered out. Military communication systems might be somewhat different and can be more powerful probably.
A combination of all, which is the most likely answer. The Russians have a wide range of EW and radar systems and they will definitely use them. Each system was made for a specific purpose, working in a specific electromagnetic spectrum, combining them all into an integrated EW leads us to this chaotic picture of interferences in several radar-bands.

3. Conclusion

What frequencies and areas are affected?
Definitely L, C and X-band and to some degree maybe also P-band. It’s highly likely that S-band is also affected. Above 10 GHz we were not able to detect something, but that does not mean that there is nothing. The sensor used above 10GHz has a very low spatial resolution and of course EW is mostly not a permanent thing, emissions appear, disappear and change in strength.

We see the strongest emissions along the Russo-Ukrainian border, Kaliningrad, St. Petersburg and Murmansk, all near high value targets, like air bases. Some quite similar signals were present in China near Taiwan, in the sea around Taiwan and in the Junta controlled areas in Myanmar.

Jamming and spoofing can be subdivided further into different categories:

Blind Ukrainian effectors : Jam their GPS, blind missile radar heads to prevent target finding
Blind ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance) : Blind radar satellite and aerial reconnaissance
Disrupt communication : Jam satellite data links, ground based communication, etc.

What systems/emitters could be responsible?
A whole bunch of different systems probably, some are specific EW systems for GPS jamming and spoofing, some for radar jamming, like Repellent-1 or Tirada-2. Others are probably air defense radars sending at maximum power, like associated radars of Pantsir or S-400 SAM systems.

Most likely scenario: a mix of all: Different systems, different purposes, all running in high energy consumption/ high emissions. Jamming (radar, gps) and detecting combined. Definitely up to X-band and definitely down to L-band, maybe even lower. SDR stations did not show much disturbance in a short test, maybe a little bit noisier near St. Petersburg in the GPS L5 band, compared to Switzerland.